Restrictive Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes

@inproceedings{Holman2011RestrictiveMA,
  title={Restrictive Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes},
  author={Bennett Holman},
  year={2011}
}
It has been argued that naturalizing the mind will result in the elimination of the ontology of folk psychology (e.g. beliefs and desires). This paper draws from a wide range of empirical literature, including from developmental and cross-cultural psychology, in building an argument for a position dubbed “restrictive materialism”. The position holds that while the ontology of folk psychology is overextended, there is a restricted domain in which the application of the folk ontology remains… CONTINUE READING

From This Paper

Topics from this paper.

References

Publications referenced by this paper.
Showing 1-10 of 21 references

Theory of mind: How children understand others’ thoughts and feelings

  • M. Press. Doherty
  • 2008
1 Excerpt

People thinking about thinking people—fMRI studies

  • R. Saxe, N. Kanwisher
  • 2003
2 Excerpts

Intentions and intentionality: Foundations of social

  • B. F. Malle, L. J. Moses, D. A. Baldwin
  • 2001
2 Excerpts

Minding minds: Evolving a reflexive mind by interpreting others

  • R. J. 462–479. Bogdan
  • Cambridge: MIT. Briggs, J
  • 2000
2 Excerpts

picture stories in autistic children

  • H. Ring, S. Wheelwright, E. Bullmore, M. Brammer, A Simmons
  • British Journal of Developmental Psychology,
  • 1999