Resource Windfalls, Political Regimes, and Political Stability

@article{Caselli2016ResourceWP,
  title={Resource Windfalls, Political Regimes, and Political Stability},
  author={Francesco Caselli and Andrea Tesei},
  journal={Review of Economics and Statistics},
  year={2016},
  volume={98},
  pages={573-590}
}
Abstract We study theoretically and empirically whether natural resource windfalls affect political regimes. We show that windfalls have no effect on democracies, while they have heterogeneous political consequences in autocracies. In deeply entrenched autocracies, the effect of windfalls is virtually nil, while in moderately entrenched autocracies, windfalls significantly exacerbate the autocratic nature of the political system. To frame the empirical work, we present a simple model in which… Expand
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