Resource Buying Games

  title={Resource Buying Games},
  author={Tobias Harks and Britta Peis},
In resource buying games a set of players jointly buys a subset of a finite resource set $$E$$E (e.g., machines, edges, or nodes in a digraph). The cost of a resource $$e$$e depends on the number (or load) of players using $$e$$e, and has to be paid completely by the players before it becomes available. Each player $$i$$i needs at least one set of a predefined family $${\mathcal S}_i\subseteq 2^E$$Si⊆2E to be available. Thus, resource buying games can be seen as a variant of congestion games in… 
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