Resource Abundance, Political Corruption, and Instability of Democracy

@inproceedings{Polterovich2007ResourceAP,
  title={Resource Abundance, Political Corruption, and Instability of Democracy},
  author={Victor Polterovich and Valentin Nikolaevich Popov and Alexander Tonis},
  year={2007}
}
In this paper we analyze data on sustainability of democratic regimes in resource rich countries and suggest a model to explain why resource abundance may lead to instability of democracy in some countries, but does not create any difficulties for a democratic system in other ones. Rate of resource rent tax is considered as the only policy instrument in our simple model. The tax affects the income of a representative voter. Choosing a tax rate, Autocrat competes with conventional Politician (a… CONTINUE READING

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