Resolving social dilemmas on evolving random networks

@inproceedings{Szolnoki2009ResolvingSD,
  title={Resolving social dilemmas on evolving random networks},
  author={Attila Szolnoki and Matja{\vz} Perc},
  year={2009}
}
We show that strategy-independent adaptations of random interaction networks can induce powerful mechanisms, ranging from the Red Queen to group selection, which promote cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas. These two mechanisms emerge spontaneously as dynamical processes due to deletions and additions of links, which are performed whenever players adopt new strategies and after a certain number of game iterations, respectively. The potency of cooperation promotion, as well as the… CONTINUE READING
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Evolution and the theory of games.

Journal of theoretical biology • 1961
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