Corpus ID: 1811660

Research Note Small States , Big Pork

@inproceedings{Hauk2005ResearchNS,
  title={Research Note Small States , Big Pork},
  author={William Hauk and Romain Wacziarg},
  year={2005}
}
Using data on authorizations from the 2005 Highway Bill, we show that the legislative allocation of pork barrel spending by U.S. state (measured by the value of transportation earmarks per capita) greatly favors smaller states. We exploit the difference between two versions of the bill: the version that was passed by the House and the compromise version passed in conference committee. Our empirical results provide strong evidence in favor of theories of legislative malapportionment. On 10… Expand

Tables from this paper

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 11 REFERENCES
Legislative Representation, Bargaining Power, and the Distribution of Federal Funds: Evidence from the U.S. Senate
While representation in the U.S. House is based upon state population, each state has an equal number (two) of U.S. Senators. Thus, relative to the state delegations in the U.S. House, smallExpand
The Impact of Federal Spending on House Election Outcomes
While it is widely believed by academics, politicians, and the popular press that incumbent members of Congress are rewarded by the electorate for bringing federal dollars to their district, theExpand
On the Vote-Purchasing Behavior of Incumbent Governments
In this paper we investigate whether there are any tactical motives behind the distribution of grants from central to lower-level governments. We use a temporary grant program that is uniquelyExpand
Bargaining in Bicameral Legislatures: When and Why Does Malapportionment Matter?
Malapportionment of seats in bicameral legislatures, it is widely argued, confers disproportionate benefits to overrepresented jurisdictions. Ample empirical research has documented that unequalExpand
Presidential Pork: Executive Veto Power and Distributive Politics
  • N. McCarty
  • Economics
  • American Political Science Review
  • 2000
It is often argued that executive powers such as the veto serve to reduce particularistic spending by the legislature. I argue that the effect of the executive veto depends strongly on assumptionsExpand
The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics
We examine what determines whether an interest group will receive favors in pork-barrel politics, using a model of majority voting with two competing parties. Each group's membership is heterogeneousExpand
EQUAL VOTES, EQUAL MONEY:COURT-ORDERED REDISTRICTING AND THE DISTRIBUTION OFPUBLIC EXPENDITURES IN THE AMERICAN STATES
A study of the effects of legislative re-districting in the states during the 1960's. Also contains data file
Openness, Country Size and the Government
This paper shows that smaller countries have a larger share of public consumption in GDP, and are also more open to trade. These empirical observations are consistent with recent theoretical modelsExpand
Database of Earmarks in Conference Agreement to the Transportation Bill
  • Taxpayers for Common Sense
  • 2005
...
1
2
...