Reputational Bargaining with Ultimatum Opportunities

  title={Reputational Bargaining with Ultimatum Opportunities},
  author={Mehmet Ekmekci and Hanzhe Zhang},
  journal={ERN: Other Game Theory \& Bargaining Theory (Topic)},
We study two-sided reputational bargaining with opportunities to issue an ultimatum---threats to force dispute resolution. Each player is either a justified type, who never concedes and issues an ultimatum whenever an opportunity arrives, or an unjustified type, who can concede, wait, or bluff with an ultimatum. In equilibrium, the presence of ultimatum opportunities can harm or benefit a player by decelerating or accelerating reputation building. When only one player can issue an ultimatum… 



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