Reputation in repeated settlement bargaining∗

Abstract

Many transactions and dispute resolutions feature a privately informed player and a pool of uninformed players. For example, a landload deals with many tenants over time, a hospital treats many patients, and a company faces potential lawsuits from its clients or labor-wage disputes with its employees. A large bulk of the literature on reputation games, repeated bargaining and dynamic sigalling explore how the informed player could strategically use and benefit from his private information. In practice, disputes are rarely resolved by the two sides alone. Amid the deadlock of a labor-wage dispute, the parties often turn to a third party, such as an arbitrator or even a court. When traders disagree on the quality of

2 Figures and Tables

Cite this paper

@inproceedings{Lee2008ReputationIR, title={Reputation in repeated settlement bargaining∗}, author={Jihong Lee and Qingmin Liu and Andy Skrzypacz}, year={2008} }