Reputation helps solve the ‘tragedy of the commons’

@article{Milinski2002ReputationHS,
  title={Reputation helps solve the ‘tragedy of the commons’},
  author={Manfred Milinski and Dirk Semmann and H. J. Krambeck},
  journal={Nature},
  year={2002},
  volume={415},
  pages={424-426}
}
The problem of sustaining a public resource that everybody is free to overuse—the ‘tragedy of the commons’—emerges in many social dilemmas, such as our inability to sustain the global climate. Public goods experiments, which are used to study this type of problem, usually confirm that the collective benefit will not be produced. Because individuals and countries often participate in several social games simultaneously, the interaction of these games may provide a sophisticated way by which to… Expand

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