Reputation and Perfection in Repeated Common Interest Games

@article{Cripps1997ReputationAP,
  title={Reputation and Perfection in Repeated Common Interest Games},
  author={Martin W. Cripps and Jonathan P. Thomas},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
  year={1997},
  volume={18},
  pages={141-158}
}
Abstract We consider a wide class of repeated common interest games perturbed with one-sided incomplete information: one player (the informed player) might be a commitment type playing the Pareto dominant action. As discounting, which is assumed to be symmetric, and the prior probability of the commitment type go to zero, it is shown that the informed player can be held close to her minmax payoff even when perfection is imposed on the equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification… 
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Two players are about to play a discounted infinitely repeated bimatrix game. Each player knows his own payoff matrix and chooses a strategy which is a best response to some private beliefs over
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