Reputation Effects Under Interdependent Values

@article{Pei2020ReputationEU,
  title={Reputation Effects Under Interdependent Values},
  author={Harry Di Pei},
  journal={Microeconomics: Asymmetric \& Private Information eJournal},
  year={2020}
}
  • H. Pei
  • Published 12 August 2018
  • Economics
  • Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information eJournal
A patient player privately observes a persistent state and interacts with an infinite sequence of myopic uninformed players. The patient player is either a strategic type who maximizes his payoff or one of several commitment types who mechanically play the same action in every period. I focus on situations in which the uninformed player's best reply to a commitment action depends on the state and where the total probability of commitment types is sufficiently small. I show that the patient… 
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