Representing roommates' preferences with symmetric utilities

  title={Representing roommates' preferences with symmetric utilities},
  author={Jos{\'e} Alvaro Rodrigues-Neto},
  journal={J. Economic Theory},
In the context of the stable roommates problem, it is shown that acyclicity of preferences is equivalent to the existence of symmetric utility functions, i.e. the utility of agent i when matched with j is the same as j’s utility when matched with i. © 2007 Published by Elsevier Inc. JEL classification: C78 

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On the existence of stable roommate matchings

K. S. Chung
Games Econ. Behav • 2000
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