Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.

  title={Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.},
  author={Daniel Kahneman and Shane Frederick},
The program of research now known as the heuristics and biases approach began with a survey of 84 participants at the 1969 meetings of the Mathematical Psychology Society and the American Psychological Association (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). The respondents, including several authors of statistics texts, were asked realistic questions about the robustness of statistical estimates and the replicability of research results. The article commented tongue-in-heek on the prevalence of a belief that… 

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