Representations gone mental

  title={Representations gone mental},
  author={Alex Morgan},
  • Alex Morgan
  • Published 2013
  • Psychology, Biology, Philosophy
  • Synthese
Many philosophers and psychologists have attempted to elucidate the nature of mental representation by appealing to notions like isomorphism or abstract structural resemblance. The ‘structural representations’ that these theorists champion are said to count as representations by virtue of functioning as internal models of distal systems. In his 2007 book, Representation Reconsidered, William Ramsey endorses the structural conception of mental representation, but uses it to develop a novel… 
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  • Philosophy
    The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
  • 2011
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  • Psychology, Biology
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