Reports, politics, and intelligence failures: The case of Iraq

  title={Reports, politics, and intelligence failures: The case of Iraq},
  author={Robert Jervis 1},
  journal={Journal of Strategic Studies},
  pages={3 - 52}
  • Robert Jervis 1
  • Published 1 February 2006
  • Political Science
  • Journal of Strategic Studies
Abstract The intelligence failure concerning Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has been the center of political controversy and official investigations in three countries. This article reviews the Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 7 July 2004, Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, a Report of a Committee of Privy Councillors to the House of Commons, 14 July 2004 (the Butler Report… 
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