• DOI:10.1080/01402390600566282
• Corpus ID: 216088620

Reports, politics, and intelligence failures: The case of Iraq

@article{Jervis12006ReportsPA,
  title={Reports, politics, and intelligence failures: The case of Iraq},
  author={Robert Jervis 1},
  journal={Journal of Strategic Studies},
  year={2006},
  volume={29},
  pages={3 - 52}
}

• Robert Jervis 1
• Published 1 February 2006
• Political Science
• Journal of Strategic Studies

Abstract The intelligence failure concerning Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has been the center of political controversy and official investigations in three countries. This article reviews the Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 7 July 2004, Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, a Report of a Committee of Privy Councillors to the House of Commons, 14 July 2004 (the Butler Report), Report to the President of the United States, The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, 31 March 2005. It explores the reasons for their deficiencies and the failure itself. This case and the investigations of it are similar to many previous ones. The investigations are marred by political bias and excessive hindsight. Neither the investigations nor contemporary intelligence on Iraqi WMD followed good social science practices. The comparative method was not utilized, confirmation bias was rampant, alternative hypotheses were not tested, and negative evidence was ignored. Although the opportunities to do better are many, the prospects for adequate reform are dim.