Reply to Philip Kitcher

@article{Longino2002ReplyTP,
  title={Reply to Philip Kitcher},
  author={Helen E. Longino},
  journal={Philosophy of Science},
  year={2002},
  volume={69},
  pages={573 - 577}
}
  • H. Longino
  • Published 1 December 2002
  • Mathematics
  • Philosophy of Science

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