Reply to Goldman: Cutting Up the One to Save the Five in Epistemology

@article{Berker2015ReplyTG,
  title={Reply to Goldman: Cutting Up the One to Save the Five in Epistemology},
  author={S. Berker},
  journal={Episteme},
  year={2015},
  volume={12},
  pages={145-153}
}
  • S. Berker
  • Published 2015
  • Philosophy
  • Episteme
  • I argue that Alvin Goldman has failed to save process reliabilism from my critique in earlier work of consequentialist or teleological epistemic theories. First, Goldman misconstrues the nature of my challenge: two of the cases he discusses I never claimed to be counterexamples to process reliabilism. Second, Goldman’s reply to the type of case I actually claimed to be a counterexample to process reliabilism is unsuccessful. He proposes a variety of responses, but all of them either feature an… CONTINUE READING
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