Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment

@article{Nieken2012RepeatedMH,
  title={Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment},
  author={Petra Nieken and Patrick W. Schmitz},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
  year={2012},
  volume={75},
  pages={1000-1008}
}
This paper reports data from a laboratory experiment on two-period moral hazard problems. The findings corroborate the contract-theoretic insight that even though the periods are technologically unrelated, due to incentive considerations principals may prefer to offer contracts with memory. 

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