# Repeated Games with Tail-Measurable Payoffs

@inproceedings{Flesch2022RepeatedGW, title={Repeated Games with Tail-Measurable Payoffs}, author={J{\'a}nos Flesch and Eilon Solan}, year={2022} }

We study multiplayer Blackwell games, which are repeated games where the payoﬀ of each player is a bounded and Borel-measurable function of the inﬁnite stream of actions played by the players during the game. These games are an extension of the two-player perfect-information games studied by David Gale and Frank Stewart (1953). Recently, various new ideas have been discovered to study Blackwell games. In this paper, we give an overview of these ideas by proving, in four diﬀerent ways, that…

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