Repeated Games with Incomplete Information on One Side: The Case of Different Discount Factors

@article{Lehrer1999RepeatedGW,
  title={Repeated Games with Incomplete Information on One Side: The Case of Different Discount Factors},
  author={Ehud Lehrer and Leeat Yariv},
  journal={Math. Oper. Res.},
  year={1999},
  volume={24},
  pages={204-218}
}
Two players engage in a repeated game with incomplete information on one side, where the underlying stage-games are zero-sum. In the case where players evaluate their stage-payoffs by using different discount factors, the payoffs of the infinitely repeated game are typically non zero-sum. However, if players grow infinitely patient, then the equilibrium payoffs will sometimes approach the zero-sum result, depending on the asymptotic relative patience of the players. We provide sufficient… CONTINUE READING
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