Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring

  title={Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring},
  author={George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris},
  journal={J. Economic Theory},
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On Failing to Cooperate When Monitoring Is Private

J. Economic Theory • 2002
View 4 Excerpts
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Toward a theory of discounted repeated games with imperfect monitoring

D. Abreu, D. Pearce, E. Stacchetti
Econometrica 58 • 1990
View 5 Excerpts
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Finite state strategies and coordination in repeated games with private monitoring

G. J. Mailath, S. Morris
University of Pennsylvania and Yale University • 2001
View 1 Excerpt

Private strategies in finitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring

G. J. Mailath, S. A. Matthews, T. Sekiguchi
CARESS Working Paper #01- 10, University of Pennsylvania • 2001

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