• Corpus ID: 244129931

RemoteVote and SAFE Vote: Towards Usable End-to-End Verification for Vote-by-Mail

  title={RemoteVote and SAFE Vote: Towards Usable End-to-End Verification for Vote-by-Mail},
  author={Braden L. Crimmins and Marshal Rhea and J. Alex Halderman},
Postal voting is growing rapidly in the U.S., with 43% of voters casting ballots by mail in 2020, yet until recently there has been little research about extending the protections of end-to-end verifiable (E2E-V) election schemes to vote-by-mail contexts. The first—and to date, only—framework to focus on this setting is STROBE, which has important usability limitations. In this work, we present two approaches, RemoteVote and SAFE Vote, that allow mail-in voters to benefit from E2E-V without… 

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