Religious experience and the probability of theism: comments on Swinburne

  title={Religious experience and the probability of theism: comments on Swinburne},
  author={Christoph J{\"a}ger},
  journal={Religious Studies},
  pages={353 - 370}
  • C. Jäger
  • Published 10 August 2017
  • Philosophy
  • Religious Studies
Abstract I discuss the role of religious experience in Richard Swinburne's probabilistic case for theism. Swinburne draws on his principle of credulity to argue that, if in addition to other evidence we consider that many people have theistic religious experiences, theism comes out as more probable than not. However, on many plausible probability assignments for the relevant non-experiential evidence, the conditional probability of theism already converges towards 1. Moreover, an argument… 
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