Relaxing Exclusive Control in Boolean Games

  title={Relaxing Exclusive Control in Boolean Games},
  author={F. Belardinelli and Umberto Grandi and A. Herzig and Dominique Longin and Emiliano Lorini and Arianna Novaro and Laurent Perrussel},
In the typical framework for boolean games (BG) each player can change the truth value of some propositional atoms, while attempting to make her goal true. In standard BG goals are propositional formulas, whereas in iterated BG goals are formulas of Linear Temporal Logic. Both notions of BG are characterised by the fact that agents have exclusive control over their set of atoms, meaning that no two agents can control the same atom. In the present contribution we drop the exclusivity assumption… Expand
Verifying Strategic Abilities in Multi-agent Systems with Private Data-Sharing
This work devise concurrent game structures with propositional control for atom-visibility (vCGS) and puts forward a methodology to model check a formula varphi in ATL* on a vCGS M, by verifying a suitable translation ofvarphi in a submodel of M. Expand
Games of influence
The interplay between simple network structures and the existence of game-theoretic solution concepts for the unanimity aggregator is investigated and bounds for the computational complexity of strategic reasoning are given in both models on arbitrary networks. Expand
Constraint Games revisited
This thesis revisits the Constraint games framework by rethinking their solving technique in terms of constraint propagation, and proposes new techniques in order to improve the resolution process. Expand
Pre-vote negotiations in binary voting with non-manipulable rules
We study voting games on binary issues, where voters hold an objective over the outcome of the collective decision and are allowed, before the vote takes place, to negotiate their ballots with theExpand
Multi-issue Voting with Propositional Goals
I present the motivating example of my thesis, as well as the relevant background literatures on judgment aggregation, belief merging, preference representation and social networks that constituteExpand


Iterated Boolean games
This work investigates the computational complexity of their associated game-theoretic decision problems, as well as semantic conditions characterising classes of LTL properties that are preserved by equilibrium points (pure-strategy Nash equilibria) whenever they exist. Expand
On Logics of Strategic Ability Based on Propositional Control
This paper ground the abstract abilities of agents in CGS on Propositional Control, thus obtaining a class of CGS that has the same expressive power as CL-PC. Expand
Boolean games
It is argued that Boolean games can be interpreted as modelling the information structures of two-person zero-sum games and the algebra of Boolean games modulo strategic equivalence is proven to be isomorphic to the Lindenbaum algebra of Classical Propositional Logic. Expand
On the logic of cooperation and propositional control
This paper studies a cooperation logic in which agents are each assumed to control a set of propositional variables--the powers of agents and coalitions then derive from the allocation of propositions to agents, and provides a complete axiom system for the logic. Expand
Alternating-time temporal logic
This work introduces a third, more general variety of temporal logic: alternating-time temporal logic offers selective quantification over those paths that are possible outcomes of games, such as the game in which the system and the environment alternate moves. Expand
On the complexity of practical ATL model checking
The complexity of the ATL and Coalition Logic model checking problems for a more "reasonable" model representation known as SRML, a simplified version of the actual model representation languages used for model checkers such as SMV and MOCHA, is investigated. Expand
Model Checking Logics of Strategic Ability: Complexity*
This chapter is about model checking and its complexity in some of the main temporal and strategic logics, e.g. LTL, CTL, and ATL. We discuss several variants of ATL (perfect vs. imperfect recall,Expand
Logics of propositional control
A number of generalizations of the CL-PC model are presented, to represent situations in which agents only partially control the value of a variable, or cases in whichagents share the control of a variables. Expand
Reasoning About the Transfer of Control
DCL-PC is presented, a logic for reasoning about how the abilities of agents and coalitions of agents are altered by transferring control from one agent to another, and two alternative semantics for the logic are given: a 'direct' semantics, in which the distributions of Boolean variables to agents are captured; and a more conventional Kripke semantics. Expand
Modular interpreted systems
A new class of representations is proposed that can be used for modeling (and model checking) temporal, strategic and epistemic properties of agents and their teams and is modular and compact in the way concurrent programs are. Expand