Relativism and Knowledge Attributions

@inproceedings{MacFarlane2009RelativismAK,
  title={Relativism and Knowledge Attributions},
  author={John MacFarlane},
  year={2009}
}
Relativism, in the sense at issue here, is a view about the meaning of knowledge attributions—statements of the form “S knows that p.” Like contextualism, it holds that the truth of knowledge claims is sensitive to contextual factors, such as which alternatives are relevant at the context, or how high the stakes are. For the relativist, however, the relevant context is the context from which the knowledge claim is being assessed, not the context at which it was made. 

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