Relational Communication

@article{Kolotilin2018RelationalC,
  title={Relational Communication},
  author={A. Kolotilin and H. Li},
  journal={Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal},
  year={2018}
}
  • A. Kolotilin, H. Li
  • Published 2018
  • Computer Science, Economics
  • Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal
  • We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with repeated interactions and voluntary transfers. Transfers motivate the receiver’s decision-making and signal the sender’s information. Although full separation can always be supported in equilibrium, partial or complete pooling is optimal if the receiver’s decision-making is too responsive to information. In this case, the receiver’s decision-making is disciplined by pooling extreme states, where she is most… CONTINUE READING

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