Relating Strands and Multiset Rewriting for Security Protocol Analysis

  title={Relating Strands and Multiset Rewriting for Security Protocol Analysis},
  author={Iliano Cervesato and Nancy A. Durgin and John C. Mitchell and Patrick Lincoln and Andre Scedrov},
Formal analysis of security protocols is largely based on a set of assumptions commonly referred to as the Dolev-Yao model. Two formalisms that state the basic assumptions of this model are related here: strand spaces [6] and multiset rewriting with existential quantification [2, 5]. Although it is fairly intuitive that these two languages should be equivalent in some way, a number of modifications to each system are required to obtain a meaningful equivalence. We extend the strand formalism… CONTINUE READING


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