Regulation and Administered Contracts

  title={Regulation and Administered Contracts},
  author={Victor P. Goldberg},
  journal={The Bell Journal of Economics},
This paper explores the ramifications of introducing administered contracts -- long term, collective contractual relationships -- into economic analysis with attention being focused on the implicit regulatory contract. The perspective afforded by the administered contracts framework suggests that the economist's case against regulation has been overstated. Many of the problems associated with regulation lie in what is being regulated, not in the act of regulation itself. Further, many of the… 

Regulation and administered contracts revisited: Lessons from transaction-cost economics for public utility regulation

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Contractual Choice

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Contractual Holdup and Legal Intervention

  • S. Shavell
  • Economics
    The Journal of Legal Studies
  • 2007
This article develops the point that incentive and risk‐bearing problems associated with contractual holdup may justify legal intervention. Contractual holdup is considered both for fresh contracts

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Economists' debate over the public utility "regulatory contract" has increasingly focused on three issues created by sunk costs: (i) Protection of sunk capital, (ii) Division of "windfalls" in a


This chapter discusses the literature on long-term contracts and relational contracts. The central issues in the literature on long-term contracts are the effects of renegotiation and what these

Transaction Cost Regulation




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