Regime Vulnerability and the Diversionary Threat of Force

  title={Regime Vulnerability and the Diversionary Threat of Force},
  author={Jonathan M Powell},
  journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution},
  pages={169 - 196}
  • Jonathan M Powell
  • Published 1 August 2012
  • Political Science
  • Journal of Conflict Resolution
In this article, I move beyond prior efforts to explore the relationship between the risk of a coup and international conflict by considering alternatives that leaders can utilize to strengthen their regimes. I offer two theoretical expectations. First, I theorize that leaders lose the incentive and ability to use diversion when the structural coup-proofing apparatus is strengthened. Second, I expect military finances to lead to disparate behavior when considering regime type. Autocrats are… 

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