Regime Vulnerability and the Diversionary Threat of Force

@article{Powell2012RegimeVA,
  title={Regime Vulnerability and the Diversionary Threat of Force},
  author={Jonathan M. Powell},
  journal={Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal},
  year={2012}
}
  • Jonathan M. Powell
  • Published 2012
  • Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal
Diversionary theory of conflict has largely been focused on democracies, specifically the United States and Great Britain. Attempts to explain the diversionary tendencies of non-democracies have not fully specified the conditions under which leaders — who do not face a legitimate prospect of losing office through elections — should have the need to utilize foreign quarrels for diversionary motives. In this paper I move beyond prior efforts to explore the relationship between coup risk and… Expand
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