Reforming an Envy-Free Matching

  title={Reforming an Envy-Free Matching},
  author={Takehiro Ito and Yuni Iwamasa and Naonori Kakimura and Naoyuki Kamiyama and Yusuke Kobayashi and Yuta Nozaki and Yoshio Okamoto and Kenta Ozeki},
  booktitle={AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
We consider the problem of reforming an envy-free matching when each agent is assigned a single item. Given an envy-free matching, we consider an operation to exchange the item of an agent with an unassigned item preferred by the agent that results in another envy-free matching. We repeat this operation as long as we can. We prove that the resulting envy-free matching is uniquely determined up to the choice of an initial envy-free matching, and can be found in polynomial time. We call the… 

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