Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

@article{Myerson1978RefinementsOT,
  title={Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept},
  author={Roger B. Myerson},
  journal={International Journal of Game Theory},
  year={1978},
  volume={7},
  pages={73-80}
}
  • R. Myerson
  • Published 1 June 1978
  • Economics
  • International Journal of Game Theory
Selten's concept of perfect equilibrium for normal form games is reviewed, and a new concept of proper equilibrium is defined. It is shown that the proper equilibria form a nonempty subset of the perfect equilibria, which in turn form a subset of the Nash equilibria. An example is given to show that these inclusions may be strict. 
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