• DOI:10.1007/BF01753236
Corpus ID: 222358176

Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

@article{Myerson1978RefinementsOT,
  title={Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept},
  author={R. Myerson},
  journal={International Journal of Game Theory},
  year={1978},
  volume={7},
  pages={73-80}
}

R. Myerson

Published 1978

Mathematics

International Journal of Game Theory

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Selten's concept of perfect equilibrium for normal form games is reviewed, and a new concept of proper equilibrium is defined. It is shown that the proper equilibria form a nonempty subset of the perfect equilibria, which in turn form a subset of the Nash equilibria. An example is given to show that these inclusions may be strict.