Refinement of Nash Equilibrium: The Main Ideas

@inproceedings{Kohlberg1990RefinementON,
  title={Refinement of Nash Equilibrium: The Main Ideas},
  author={E. Kohlberg},
  year={1990}
}
  • E. Kohlberg
  • Published 1990
  • Mathematics
  • Publisher Summary This chapter discusses the main ideas on the refinements of Nash equilibrium. The number of refinements that have been proposed is staggering. Among others, there are subgame-perfect, perfect, proper, sequential, persistent, justifiable, neologism-proof, stable, perfect-sequential, intuitive, divine, undefeated, and explicable equilibria. This proliferation does not stem from differences in the underlying concepts; on the contrary, all the refinements represent attempts to… CONTINUE READING
    58 Citations
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