Referrals : Peer Screening and Enforcement in a Consumer Credit Field Experiment

@inproceedings{Bryan2013ReferralsP,
  title={Referrals : Peer Screening and Enforcement in a Consumer Credit Field Experiment},
  author={G. Edward Bryan and Dean Karlan and Jonathan Zinman},
  year={2013}
}
Empirical evidence on peer intermediation lags behind many years of lending practice and a large body of theory in which lenders use peers to mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard. Using a simple referral incentive mechanism under individual liability, we develop and implement a two-stage field experiment that permits separate identification of peer screening and enforcement effects. We allow for borrower heterogeneity in both ex-ante repayment type and ex-post susceptibility to social… CONTINUE READING

References

Publications referenced by this paper.
Showing 1-10 of 35 references

Guinnane, “Thy neighbor’s keeper: The design of a credit cooperative with theory and a test,

  • T. Besley, T.W
  • The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
  • 1994
Highly Influential
3 Excerpts

“ Referrals : Peer Screening and Enforcement in a Consumer Credit Field Experiment : Dataset . ” American Economic Journal : Microeconomics

  • Fenella Carpena, Shawn Cole, Jeremy Shapiro, Bilal Zia
  • 2015

“ Information Asymmetries in Crop Insurance

  • Dean Karlan, Melanie Morten, Jonathan Zinman
  • 2014

Cosigners as Collateral,

  • S. Klonner, A. S. Rai
  • Journal of Development Economics,
  • 2010
1 Excerpt

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…