Reference, perception, and attention

@article{Raftopoulos2009ReferencePA,
  title={Reference, perception, and attention},
  author={Athanasios Raftopoulos},
  journal={Philosophical Studies},
  year={2009},
  volume={144},
  pages={339-360}
}
  • A. Raftopoulos
  • Published 1 June 2009
  • Biology, Psychology
  • Philosophical Studies
I examine John Campbell’s claim that the determination of the reference of a perceptual demonstrative requires conscious visual object-based selective attention. I argue that although Campbell’s claim to the effect that, first, a complex binding parameter is needed to establish the referent of a perceptual demonstrative, and, second, that this referent is determined independently of, and before, the application of sortals is correct, this binding parameter does not require object-based… 
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Two visual systems and the feeling of presence
When
 I
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 in
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 armchair,
 I
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 close
my
eyes
 and
 summon
up
a
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detailed
and
vivid
image
of
my
hands
on
a
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keyboard.

This
state
of
visual
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is
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TLDR
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