Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization: Approximation Algorithms and other Generalizations

@inproceedings{Cai2013ReducingRT,
  title={Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization: Approximation Algorithms and other Generalizations},
  author={Yang Cai and C. Daskalakis and S. Weinberg},
  booktitle={SODA},
  year={2013}
}
It was recently shown in [12] that revenue optimization can be computationally efficiently reduced to welfare optimization in all multi-dimensional Bayesian auction problems with arbitrary (possibly combinatorial) feasibility constraints and independent additive bidders with arbitrary (possibly combinatorial) demand constraints. This reduction provides a poly-time solution to the optimal mechanism design problem in all auction settings where welfare optimization can be solved efficiently, but… Expand
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