Reduced prizes and increased effort in contests

@article{Epstein2006ReducedPA,
  title={Reduced prizes and increased effort in contests},
  author={Gil S. Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan},
  journal={Social Choice and Welfare},
  year={2006},
  volume={26},
  pages={447-453}
}
We study the general class of two-player public-policy contests and specify the asymmetry condition under which a more restrained government intervention that reduces the contestants’ prizes has the "perverse" effect of increasing their aggregate lobbying efforts. 

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