Redefine statistical significance

  title={Redefine statistical significance},
  author={Daniel J. Benjamin and James O. Berger and Magnus Johannesson and Brian A. Nosek and Eric-Jan Wagenmakers and Richard A. Berk and Kenneth A. Bollen and Bj{\"o}rn Brembs and Lawrence Brown and Colin Camerer and David Cesarini and Christopher D. Chambers and Merlise A. Clyde and Thomas D Cook and Paul De Boeck and Zoltan P. Di{\'e}n{\`e}s and Anna Dreber and Kenny Easwaran and Charles Efferson and Ernst Fehr and Fiona Fidler and Andy P. Field and Malcolm Forster and Edward I. George and Richard Gonzalez and Steven Goodman and Edwin Green and Donald P. Green and Anthony G Greenwald and Jarrod D. Hadfield and Larry V Hedges and Leonhard Held and Teck Hua Ho and Herbert Hoijtink and Daniel J. Hruschka and Kosuke Imai and Guido Imbens and John P. A. Ioannidis and Mi-hye Jeon and James Holland Jones and Michael Kirchler and David I. Laibson and John A. List and R. Little and Arthur Lupia and Edouard Machery and Scott E. Maxwell and Michael Mccarthy and Don A. Moore and Stephen L. Morgan and Marcus Robert Munafo and Shinichi Nakagawa and Brendan Nyhan and Timothy H. Parker and Luis R. Pericchi and Marco Perugini and Jeffrey N. Rouder and Judith Rousseau and Victoria Savalei and Felix D. Sch{\"o}nbrodt and Thomas M. Sellke and Betsy Sinclair and Dustin Tingley and Trisha Van Zandt and Simine Vazire and Duncan J. Watts and Christopher Winship and Robert L. Wolpert and Yumeng Xie and Cristobal Young and Jonathan Zinman and Valen E. Johnson},
  journal={Nature Human Behaviour},
We propose to change the default P-value threshold for statistical significance from 0.05 to 0.005 for claims of new discoveries. 
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