Recouping after Coup-Proofing: Compromised Military Effectiveness and Strategic Substitution

C. S. Brown; Christopher J. Fariss; R. B. McMahon

DOI:10.1080/03050629.2015.1046598

Corpus ID: 214653333

Recouping after Coup-Proofing: Compromised Military Effectiveness and Strategic Substitution

@article{Brown2016RecoupingAC,
  title={Recouping after Coup-Proofing: Compromised Military Effectiveness and Strategic Substitution},
  author={C. S. Brown and Christopher J. Fariss and R. B. McMahon},
  journal={International Interactions},
  year={2016},
  volume={42},
  pages={1 - 30}
}

C. S. Brown, Christopher J. Fariss, R. B. McMahon

Published 2016

International Interactions

ABSTRACT In order to counter the threat of a coup, states often undertake a number of strategies to “coup-proof” their militaries, such as creating institutional redundancy, severely limiting interbranch communications, and basing promotions on loyalty rather than merit. As a result of such policies, however, the fighting effectiveness of these armed forces is degraded, and the marginal return on military investment is greatly reduced. We argue that leaders who have coup-proofed their… CONTINUE READING

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