Recouping after Coup-Proofing: Compromised Military Effectiveness and Strategic Substitution

  title={Recouping after Coup-Proofing: Compromised Military Effectiveness and Strategic Substitution},
  author={Cameron Shepherd Brown and Christopher J. Fariss and R. Blake McMahon},
  journal={International Interactions},
  pages={1 - 30}
ABSTRACT In order to counter the threat of a coup, states often undertake a number of strategies to “coup-proof” their militaries, such as creating institutional redundancy, severely limiting interbranch communications, and basing promotions on loyalty rather than merit. As a result of such policies, however, the fighting effectiveness of these armed forces is degraded, and the marginal return on military investment is greatly reduced. We argue that leaders who have coup-proofed their… 
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