Reconciling Rationality with Deterrence

  title={Reconciling Rationality with Deterrence},
  author={F. C. Zagare},
  journal={Journal of Theoretical Politics},
  pages={107 - 141}
  • F. Zagare
  • Published 1 April 2004
  • Economics
  • Journal of Theoretical Politics
This article argues that classical (or rational) deterrence theory is logically inconsistent, empirically inaccurate and prescriptively deficient. In its stead it offers an alternative theoretical framework – perfect deterrence theory – that makes consistent use of the rationality postulate and is in accord with the empirical literature of deterrence. Perfect deterrence theory’s axiomatic base, its empirical expectations and its most significant policy prescriptions are highlighted and… 

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