Reciprocity in the shadow of Threat

  title={Reciprocity in the shadow of Threat},
  author={Raul Caruso},
This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents evaluate differently a contested stake. Differently from common contest models, agents have the option of choosing a second instrument to affect the outcome of the conflict. The second instrument is assumed to capture positive investments in ‘conflict management’ labelled as ‘talks’. It will be demonstrated that the asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake does constitute a… CONTINUE READING

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