Reciprocal dumping by locally regulated monopolists

  title={Reciprocal dumping by locally regulated monopolists},
  author={Georges Zaccour and S{\'e}bastien Debia},
  • Georges Zaccour, Sébastien Debia
  • Published 2016
This paper develops an international-trade game with two locally regulated producers. They may freely export but have to sell in their local market at a price equal to their marginal cost. We consider a setting where local production is decided after exports. The rationale for this sequentiality in decision making is in the fact that exports are often set by contract long before expedition takes actually place. In the parlance of game theory, the game is played with a closed-loop information… CONTINUE READING

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