Recipient Preferences and the Design of Government Transfer Programs

  title={Recipient Preferences and the Design of Government Transfer Programs},
  author={Russell D. Roberts},
  journal={The Journal of Law and Economics},
  pages={27 - 54}
  • R. Roberts
  • Published 1 April 1985
  • Economics
  • The Journal of Law and Economics
MOST work on the marginal tax rates of government transfer programs has focused on their effect on labor supply. It is commonly argued that taxpayers prefer low tax rates because they encourage work effort but dislike low tax rates because they raise the break-even point and thereby dilute the ability of a given amount of spending to fight poverty. No formal model has been worked out to predict how the tax rate will be set in the face of this trade-off. 
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  • R. Roberts
  • Economics
    Journal of Political Economy
  • 1984
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