Rebutting formally valid counterexamples to the Humean “is-ought” dictum

@article{Guevara2007RebuttingFV,
  title={Rebutting formally valid counterexamples to the Humean “is-ought” dictum},
  author={Daniel Guevara},
  journal={Synthese},
  year={2007},
  volume={164},
  pages={45-60}
}
Various formally valid counterexamples have been adduced against the Humean dictum that one cannot derive an “ought” from an “is.” There are formal rebuttals—some very sophisticated now (e.g., Charles R. Pigden’s and Gerhard Schurz’s)—to such counterexamples. But what follows is an intuitive and informal argument against them. I maintain that it is better than these sophisticated formal defenses of the Humean dictum and that it also helps us see why it implausible to think that we can be as… Expand
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