Rebellions, Technical Change, and the Early Development of Political Institutions in Latin America

  title={Rebellions, Technical Change, and the Early Development of Political Institutions in Latin America},
  author={{\'A}lvaro Aguirre},
  journal={Journal of Comparative Economics},
  • Álvaro Aguirre
  • Published 2013
  • Political Science
  • Journal of Comparative Economics
Abstract This paper examines the early development of institutions in Latin America that led to the consolidation of oligarchic republics in the first decades of the twentieth century. First, it documents an institutional divergence inside the region with long lasting effects on subsequent political and economic development. Second, it develops a theoretical model focusing on two factors to explain institutional development, the risk of native and slave uprisings and technical change, both of… Expand
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