Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity

  title={Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity},
  author={Paul. Collier},
  journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution},
  pages={839 - 853}
  • P. Collier
  • Published 2000
  • Economics
  • Journal of Conflict Resolution
Economic models of rebellion usually treat it as a form of crime or banditry. However, the analogy is not developed. This article treats rebellion as a distinctive form of organized crime that differs from other crime in its objective, which is the predation of the rents on natural resource exports. Because such rents can be defended by government forces, rebel forces must be sufficiently large to defend themselves. This introduces a survival constraint that affects whether a rebellion is… Expand
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