Reassessing Prosecutorial Power Through the Lens of Mass Incarceration

  title={Reassessing Prosecutorial Power Through the Lens of Mass Incarceration},
  author={Jeffrey Bellin},
  journal={Michigan Law Review},
A review of John F. Pfaff, Locked In: The True Causes of Mass Incarceration - And How to Achieve Real Reform. 
Structuring prosecutorial power
Prosecutors play a decisive role in contemporary criminal justice. Their decisions greatly influence the output of the system, as well as the behaviour of other criminal justice institutions. By
The Problems With Prosecutors
Most scholarship on prosecutors in the United States is diagnostic, prescriptive, or both; the motivating questions are, What is the problem with prosecutors, and how do we fix it? Answering those


The Effects of Depth and Distance in a Criminal Code on Charging, Sentencing, and Prosecutor Power
Today's conventional wisdom about criminal justice in the United States tells us that criminal codes do not matter much. The real impact of the criminal law appears not in the statute books but in
Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutor Self-Regulation
This Article examines potential efforts by sentencing commissions to influence the work of prosecutors, especially the charges they select and the plea bargains they enter. The practical objections
The Prison Boom and Sentencing Policy
The existing literature on the role of changes in sentencing policies as drivers of growth in prison populations contains findings that appear contradictory. We present a new method for
Attorney Competence in an Age of Plea Bargaining and Econometrics
This Essay explores the concept of attorney competence in a criminal justice system dominated by plea bargaining. It focuses, in particular, on the results of a widely-reported empirical study of
The Invisible Revolution in Plea Bargaining: Managerial Judging and Judicial Participation in Negotiations
This article, the most comprehensive study of judicial participation in plea negotiations since the 1970s, reveals a stunning array of new procedures that involve judges routinely in the settlement
Prosecutors and Overcriminalization: Thoughts on Political Dynamics and a Doctrinal Response
We know prosecutors take advantage of overcriminalization. Yet we also know they do much to mitigate it. So much, in fact, that they largely keep overcriminalization from becoming a salient political
Plea Bargaining and Price Theory
Like other markets, the plea bargaining market uses a pricing mechanism to coordinate market functions and to communicate critical information to participants, information that permits rational