Reasons and Persons

@inproceedings{Parfit1984ReasonsAP,
  title={Reasons and Persons},
  author={Derek Parfit},
  year={1984}
}
This book challenges, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity. The author claims that we have a false view of our own nature; that it is often rational to act against our own best interests; that most of us have moral views that are directly self-defeating; and that, when we consider future generations the conclusions will often be disturbing. He concludes that moral non-religious moral philosophy is a young subject, with a… 
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