Reasoning with Moral Conflicts

  title={Reasoning with Moral Conflicts},
  author={John F. Horty},
  • J. Horty
  • Published 1 December 2003
  • Philosophy
  • Noûs
1I ntroduction Let us say that a normative conflict is a situation in which an agent ought to perform an action A, and also ought to perform an action B, but in which it is impossible for the agent to perform both A and B. Not all normative conflicts are moral conflicts, of course. It may be that the agent ought to perform the action A for reasons of personal generosity, but ought to perform the action B for reasons of prudence: perhaps A involves buying a lavishgift for a friend, wh ile B… 
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