Reasoning the fast and frugal way: models of bounded rationality.

  title={Reasoning the fast and frugal way: models of bounded rationality.},
  author={Gerd Gigerenzer and Daniel G. Goldstein},
  journal={Psychological review},
  volume={103 4},
Humans and animals make inferences about the world under limited time and knowledge. In contrast, many models of rational inference treat the mind as a Laplacean Demon, equipped with unlimited time, knowledge, and computational might. Following H. Simon's notion of satisfying, the authors have proposed a family of algorithms based on a simple psychological mechanism: one-reason decision making. These fast and frugal algorithms violate fundamental tenets of classical rationality: They neither… 

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