Reasoning About Strategies and Rational Play in Dynamic Games

@inproceedings{Bonanno2015ReasoningAS,
  title={Reasoning About Strategies and Rational Play in Dynamic Games},
  author={Giacomo Bonanno},
  booktitle={Models of Strategic Reasoning},
  year={2015}
}
We discuss a number of conceptual issues that arise in attempting to capture, in dynamic games, the notion that there is “common understanding” among the players that they are all rational. 

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